A note on the link between public expenditures and distortionary taxation by Thomas Gaube
A note on the link between public expenditures and
distortionary taxation 
Thomas Gaube
Department of Economics, University of Vienna
Abstract
This note deals with the optimal provision of a public good in the context of the Ramsey tax
model. It is shown that the second-best level of public good provision is inefficiently low
relative to a situation where additional expenditures can be financed by lump-sum taxation.
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The appropriate size of government expenditures is a prominent issue in economic de-
bate. This topic is usually discussed by comparing marginal costs and marginal beneﬁts
of public spending. With respect to the cost side of such a comparison, the excess bur-
den of taxation has gained considerable attention nin the literature. This issue goes back
to a hypothesis ﬁrst proposed by Pigou (1947) who argued that distortionary taxation
inﬂicts indirect damage on the representative citizen such that tax ﬁnanced provision of
a public good should not be carried out as far as would be optimal in a ﬁctitious world
with lump-sum taxation.
In terms of formal analysis, this hypothesis has been interpreted in two diﬀerent
ways. First, it was translated to the claim that the sum of the marginal rates of substi-
tution

MRSGk between a public good G and a private reference commodity k exceeds
the marginal rate of transformation MRT between the public good and the private
commodity in the second-best optimum with distortionary taxation. Second, it was sug-
gested that the optimal level of public good provision GS in the presence of distortionary
taxation is below the ﬁrst-best provision level GF, where lump-sum taxes are used for
ﬁnancing public expenditures (see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, Ch. 16 and Myles
1995, Ch. 9 for a discussion of these hypotheses). However, none of these statements is
correct: First, using Ramsey’s tax model, Atkinson and Stern (1974) have shown that
the claim

MRSGk > MRT holds only in speciﬁc circumstances, which depend on the
choice of the reference commodity k. Second, some recent analyses have pointed out that
counterexamples to the claim GS <G F can be constructed as well (de Bartolom´ e 1998,
Gaube 2000, Gronberg and Liu 2001). Taken together, these ﬁndings raise the question
whether the intuitive claim that a less eﬃcient tax system should lead to a lower level
of public expenditures can be justiﬁed by a robust formal property of the second-best
optimum at all.
In this note, such a justiﬁcation is provided: I show that a local increase in public good
provision is desirable in second best as long as additional expenditures can be ﬁnanced
by means of lump-sum taxation. This ﬁnding is in the spirit of another local result
derived by Atkinson and Stern (1974). They consider the ﬁrst-best optimum and show
that a marginal reduction of the lump-sum tax decreases the optimal level of public
good provision for the case of additively separable preferences.1 The present analysis
refers to the more interesting second-best allocation and relies only on the assumption
that preferences are strictly quasiconcave. In contrast to earlier analyses, the ﬁnding
is established by analyzing the second-best problem in quantity space. In this way, I
also provide a geometric characterization of the second-best provision rule, which shows
that Samuelson’s condition holds in the optimum with distortionary taxation as long
as it is taken into account that a change in tax rates aﬀects all private commodities
simultaneously.
1Since the (ﬁctitious) ﬁrst-best optimum is of limited interest in the present context, the local
approach proposed by Atkinson and Stern (1974) received little attention in the literature. For an
exception, see Mirrlees (1994).
12. The Model
Consider an economy with H identical individuals2 whose preferences are described by
a strictly quasiconcave utility function U(x,l,G), where x,l,a n dG stand for private
consumption, leisure, and a public good respectively. Each individual has an endowment
of e>0 units of leisure which can be used to produce the commodities x and G by
means of a linear technology. Normalizing the marginal rates of transformation MRT to
unity, the per-capita production constraint
e − l − x −
G
H
≥ 0( 1 )
is obtained. It is assumed that the public good is provided for free by the government,
which ﬁnances its expenditures either by linear taxes tl,t x imposed on labor supply
e − l and consumption x, or by means of a lump-sum tax T. The producer prices of
x,l,a n dG are normalized to unity. Hence, the consumer prices of x and l equal q =
1+tx and w =1− tl. Accordingly, the budget constraint of the individuals can be
written in the form we − wl − qx − T ≥ 0. Maximizing utility U(x,l,G) subject to
this constraint, the demand functions x(q,w,T,G),l(q,w,T,G) and the indirect utility
function V (q,w,T,G) are obtained.
The benevolent government maximizes welfare of the representative individual sub-
ject to the budget constraint




As long as the lump-sum tax T is available, no distortionary taxes tl,t x are imposed in
the optimum and a ﬁrst-best allocation (xF,l F,G F) is implemented. In this case, the
Samuelson conditions

MRSGx =1a n d

MRSGl = 1 are satisﬁed, where MRSGx :=
UG/Ux and MRSGl := UG/Ul denote the agents’ marginal rates of substitution between
the public good and the two private commodities x and l, respectively.
Consider now the second-best framework, where lump-sum taxation is ruled out by
assumption. The common way of investigating this model proceeds as follows: First, one
of the tax rates tx,t l is normalized to zero such that the corresponding commodity x or l
serves as the unit of account. Then the indirect utility V (·) is maximized with respect to
G and the remaining tax rate subject to the government’s budget constraint (2). Based on
the ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem, a modiﬁed Samuelson rule

MRSGk =M C F
is derived, where k ∈{ x,l} is the unit of account and MCF is the marginal cost of
public funds. The interpretation of this rule, however, is diﬃcult because the MCF -
in contrast to the second-best allocation - is diﬀerent for the cases tx =0a n dtl =0 .
In particular, the MCF can be above or below unity depending on whether x or l is
chosen as the num´ eraire (see e.g. Mayshar 1990, H˚ akonsen 1998, and Gaube 2000 for a
discussion). Therefore, I will complement these analyses by investigating the second-best
2In the present context, only the eﬃciency eﬀects of distortionary taxation and public good provision
are of interest. Clearly, distributional eﬀects may play an important role as well (see e.g. Wilson 1991,
Mirrlees 1994, Sandmo 1998, and Gaube 2000, 2005).
2problem in commodity space. In this context nominal prices play no role and tl =0c a n
be chosen just for convenience. Since lump-sum taxation is ruled out by assumption, the
government’s budget constraint (2) then reduces to




Using this constraint, we can deﬁne
OC := {l,x |∃q,G : l = l(q,1,0,G),x= x(q,1,0,G),B (q,G)=0 }.
The set OC contains all pairs (l,x) that can be implemented in an equilibrium with
distortionary taxation provided that the government’s budget is balanced. Note that
this set is equivalent to the agent’s oﬀer curve as long as the demand functions x(·)a n d
l(·) are independent of G.3 In general, however, OC represents a modiﬁed oﬀer curve
because the eﬀect of public good provision on private demand x(·),l(·)i st a k e ni n t o
account as well.
Since the elements of OC fulﬁl all restrictions that follow from distortionary tax-
ation, any vector (x,l,G) that satisﬁes OC and the production constraint (1) can be













In the subsequent analysis, I will establish two properties of this allocation. First, it
is pointed out that a speciﬁc version of Samuelson’s rule holds in the optimum (3).
Based on this ﬁnding, I will then show that a marginal increase in public good provision
is welfare improving, provided that these additional expenditures can be ﬁnanced by
means of lump-sum taxation.
Before investigating the optimum (3) one should note that the ﬁrst-best allocation
can be derived in a similar way: With a lump-sum tax, the government’s budget is
balanced as long as T − G/H =0 .S i n c eT aﬀects private consumption only via an
income eﬀect, all pairs (l,x) that lie on the Engel curve4




can be implemented. In the ﬁrst-best optimum (lF,x F,G F), utility U(l,x,G)i st h u s
maximized subject to the constraints (1) and (l,x) ∈ EC.
3. Provision Rule and Welfare Improvements
3This property holds if and only if U(x,l,G) is weakly separable between (x,l)a n dG.I nt h e
literature, weak separability has often been used as a benchmark for analyzing the link between public
good provision and distortionary taxation. Some work (see e.g. Chang 2000) relies on another benchmark
where compensated demand is assumed to be independent of G.
4In analogy to the deﬁnition of OC, the set EC coincides with the individuals’ Engel curves only if
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FIGURE 1. The second-best optimum
The maximization problem (3) is illustrated in Figure 1a for a situation where U(x,l,G)
is weakly separable between (x,l)a n dG and homogeneous in (x,l). Separability implies
that the demand functions x(·)a n dl(·) do not depend on the level of public good
provision G. Due to homogeneity, we thus obtain a linear Engel curve EC which hits
the oﬀer curve OC only for the trivial case (q −1) = T = 0 where the government’s tax
revenue equals zero.5
The triangle e − e − He in Figure 1a represents the per-capita production frontier,
i.e. those combinations of x, l and G which satisfy the constraint (1) with equality. Since
the curve EC describes those combinations of x and l that can be achieved if lump-sum
taxation is employed for ﬁnancing public expenditures, the ﬁrst-best optimum F must
lie above of EC on the production frontier. With distortionary taxation, however, only
allocations above of OC can be implemented. The second-best optimum (xS,l S,G S)i s
thus obtained by maximizing utility U(x,l,G) subject to the line  OC, i.e. the projection
of OC on the production frontier. A point S ∈  OC can be second best only if the agent’s
indiﬀerence surface (in x − l − G-space) is tangent to  OC in S. This implies that the
indiﬀerence surface must also be tangent to the line AB on the production frontier.
Therefore, Samuelson’s condition holds in second best provided that the amount of
5Due to the substitution eﬀect, OC must lie on the left of EC for any allocation with x+l<e .T h e
speciﬁc shape of OC depends on whether an increase in q increases or decreases l, that is whether the
substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect, or vice versa.
4private-goods consumption is measured by means of a composite commodity γx+(1−γ)l
whose weights γ and (1 − γ) are proportional to the slope of the oﬀer curve OC.
Before exploring the second-best Samuelson condition in more detail, it should be
noted that an example of this rule is well-known from the literature: With Cobb-Douglas
preferences U(x,l,G)=˜ U(xαl1−α,G), the oﬀer curve OC is linear and parallel to the
x-axis. Hence, AB is also parallel to the x-axis and a speciﬁc version of Samuelson’s rule,
namely

MRSGx = 1 must hold in second best. Accordingly, one obtains MCF = 1 as
long as x serves as the unit of account. Due to the latter property, the Cobb-Douglas
example has often been used for illustrating that MCF ≤ 1 is possible even though the
marginal excess burden is positive.6
For an analytical exposition of the graphical argument in Figure 1a , let deﬁne one
unit of private consumption by means of a commodity bundle γx+(1−γ)l that consists
of γ ∈ R units of x and (1 − γ) ∈ R units of l. This deﬁnition leads to the marginal






Consider next the oﬀer curve OC. Totally diﬀerentiating the budget constraint B(q,G)=
0, one obtains dq/dG := −(∂B/∂G)/(∂B/∂q), i.e. the eﬀect of a change in public good
provision on the consumer price q. Taking this indirect eﬀect into account, the total
eﬀect of an increase in G on the individual’s demand for private consumption x and






















Note that the ratio between the derivatives xoc
G and loc
G determines the slope of the oﬀer
curve OC. Hence, according to the graphical argument presented above, Samuelson’s
rule

MRS (γ) = 1 holds in second best as long as the weights γ and 1 − γ of the
composite commodity are proportional to xoc
G and loc










which implies 1 − γoc = loc
G/(xoc
G + loc
G). Based on this deﬁnition, one obtains
Proposition 1: In the second-best optimum (3), we have

MRS (γoc)=1 .
Proof: Totally diﬀerentiating the budget constraint e − qx(·) − l(·) = 0 with respect
to G and q,o n eo b t a i n sq(∂x(·)/∂G)+∂l(·)/∂G =0a n dq(∂x(·)/∂q)+x + ∂l(·)/∂q =
0 respectively. Using these equations, the property xoc
G + loc
G = −1/H can easily be
established. This implies γoc = −Hxoc
G and 1−γoc = −Hloc
G. Consider now an allocation
(x,l,G) where the constraints contained in (3) are satisﬁed. If the level of public good
6See Mayshar 1990, Triest 1990, Ballard and Fullerton 1992, and H˚ akonsen 1998 for a discussion.
5provision G is changed without violating the constraint (x,l) ∈ OC, the total eﬀect on





G = −1/H the constraint (1) then remains satisﬁed as well. Hence, in
the second-best optimum (3), we must have UG +Uxxoc
G +Ulloc
G = 0. Using γoc = −Hxoc
G
and 1 − γoc = −Hloc
G, this condition immediately leads to

MRS (γoc)=1 .
In the ﬁrst-best optimum F, the agents’ indiﬀerence surface is tangent to the pro-
duction frontier e − e − He in all directions. Samuelson’s rule is thus equivalent to

MRS (γ) = 1 for all γ ∈ R. Proposition 1 shows that a speciﬁc version of this rule
also holds in the second-best optimum (3). This ﬁnding relies on the observation that
a tax ﬁnanced increase in public good provision aﬀects the agents’ demand for private
consumption x and leisure l in a particular way, namely in proportion to the weights γoc
and 1−γoc. As long as this constraint is taken into account, the logic behind Samuelson’s
rule can be applied to the model with distortionary taxation as well.
Proposition 1 complements earlier analyses that have characterized the second-best
optimum by means of the marginal rate of substitution MRSGx or MRSGl, i.e. by assum-
ing that either x or l serves as the unit of account. In the present context, these cases
refer to the weights γ =1a n dγ = 0 respectively. As long as γoc  =1a n dγoc  =0 ,t h e
corresponding marginal cost of public funds MCF =

MRS (γ) thus deviate from unity.
These deviations, however, do not reﬂect the excess burden of distortionary taxation,
but the diﬀerence between a thought experiment where it is assumed that an increase
in G is ﬁnanced by reducing only private consumption x or leisure l, whereas the real
experiment of tax ﬁnancing aﬀects x and l simultaneously.
Note that the term MRS (γ) is decreasing in the parameter γ provided that Ux >U l.
Since utility maximization of each agent implies Ux/Ul = q/w =1+tx, the inequality
Ux >U l must hold in the optimum (3). As a consequence of Proposition 1, we thus have

MRS (γ) > 1 in second best if and only if γ<γ oc.7 In other words, a further increase
in public good provision increases welfare if and only if the corresponding change in
private consumption takes place by a γ-percent reduction in x and a (1 − γ)-percent
reduction in l,w h e r eγ<γ oc (see Figure 1b). This observation immediately leads to
the main result of this note, namely that a local increase in public good provision is
desirable in the second-best optimum (3) provided that the additional expenditures can
be ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation T>0.
Proposition 2: Consider the second-best optimum (3) and assume that additional
government expenditures can be ﬁnanced by means of a lump-sum tax T. Then a marginal
increase in public good provision G is welfare improving as long as the distortionary tax
rate (q −1) > 0 or the revenue from distortionary taxation (q −1)x>0 is kept constant
in equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the second-best quantity GS and the corresponding price qS. Assume
now that GS is marginally increased to ˜ G. Since the indirect utility V (q,w,T,G)i s
7This property means that the second-best indiﬀerence surface appears to be ﬂatter or steeper than
the production frontier depending on whether one moves from S towards some direction γ< γ oc or
γ>γ oc (see Figure 1b).
6increasing in G and decreasing in q,w em u s th a v edq/dG > 0 in second best. Therefore,
the expenditure level ˜ G requires some consumer price ˜ q>q S as long as the lump-
sum tax T = 0 is not changed. Assume instead that qS remains constant and that the
diﬀerence ˜ G − GS > 0 is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax ˜ T.T h e nw eh a v ex(qS,1, ˜ T, ˜ G)+
l(qS,1, ˜ T, ˜ G)=x(˜ q,1,0, ˜ G)+l(˜ q,1,0, ˜ G). Since ˜ q>q S leads to a substitution eﬀect
between the commodities x and l, the inequality x(qS,1, ˜ T, ˜ G) >x (˜ q,1,0, ˜ G)m u s th o l d .
Hence, the lump-sum tax ˜ T reduces private consumption (x,l) into some direction ˜ γ<
γoc (see Figure 1 (b)). Therefore,

MRS (˜ γ) > 1 which in turn implies that the increase
in G is welfare improving. Note that the same argument can be used if the revenue
(q − 1)x(·) is kept constant because this assumption also implies a positive lump-sum
tax ˆ T := (1/H)( ˜ G−GS). In this case, the price ˆ q is chosen which is implicitly determined
by means of the condition (ˆ q−1)x(ˆ q,1, ˆ T, ˜ G)=( qS−1)x(qS,1,0,G S). Because of ˆ T>0,
one obtains ˆ q<˜ q which implies that the demand l(ˆ q,1, ˆ T, ˜ G),x(ˆ q,1, ˆ T, ˜ G) must also lie
on the right of the line AD in Figure 1. 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward: Since the lump-sum tax is
always more eﬃcient than the distortionary tax at the margin,8 an increase in public good
provision must be welfare improving in second best provided that additional expenditures
can be ﬁnanced without further increasing the excess burden of taxation. As mentioned
in the introductory section, earlier analyses on the link between public good provision




MRSGl > 1, or GS <G F are fulﬁlled in second best. This literature
has shown that none of these inequalities hold in general even if it is assumed that the
demand functions x(·)a n dl(·) are independent of G. In contrast, Proposition 2 only
relies on the assumption that U(x,l,G) is strictly quasiconcave. Hence, the ﬁnding is
based on a pure substitution eﬀect which takes place irrespective of whether the above-
mentioned inequalities are satisﬁed. In particular, no assumption concerning the eﬀect
of G on the demand x(·) of the taxed commodity is made. In this way, a robust property
of the second-best optimum is established that conﬁrms the intuitive claim that public
expenditures should not be carried out as far as would be done if lump-sum taxation
were available.
It should be noted that the reasoning that underlies Propositions 1 and 2 can also
be applied if one allows for a vector x =( x1,...,xn) of consumption commodities and a
corresponding vector of excise taxes ti =( qi − 1), i =1 ,...,n. In this case, the second
best problem can be analyzed in two steps. First, the optimal prices (taxes) q(G)=
(q1(G),...,qn(G)) are derived for an exogenous level of public expenditures G.T h e n
utility U(x,l,G) is maximized subject to the requirement x =ˆ x(G): =x(q(G),1,G),
l = ˆ l(G): =l(q(G),1,G), and the production constraint e −
n
i=1 xi − l − G/H ≥ 0.
Note that the constraint (x,l)=( ˆ x(G),ˆ l(G)) represents the agents’ (modiﬁed) oﬀer
curve along the path of optimal prices qi(G). Accordingly, Samuelson’s rule is obtained
in second best if private consumption is expressed by means of a commodity bundle
8This means that the marginal cost of public funds MCF of the lump-sum tax is below the MCF of
the distortionary tax irrespective of whether the latter exceeds unity.
7n
i=1 γixi + γ0l where the parameters (γ0,γ 1,...,γn) are proportional to the derivatives
(∂ˆ l/∂G,∂ˆ x1/∂G,...,∂ˆ xn/∂G), and
n
i=0 γi = 1. This property is analogous to Proposi-
tion 1. Using the structure of the second-best prices qi(G), Proposition 2 can then be
established as well.
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